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One of the unresolved issues in corporate restructuring is the distribution of 
take over gains. Empirical evidence indicates that in take-over bids most of 
the benefits are captured by the target shareholders under the form of large 
price premiums. The standard view, in academia, is that these premiums 
are determined by competition among bidders (or the threat of competitive 
bids); bargaining, although often observed in practice, has no place in this 
framework. We argue that bargaining is an important ingredient of a take-
over, even in hostile situations: in fact, we deal almost exclusively with 
"unfriendly" take-overs, i.e. acquisitions where the target's current 
management has to leave. The paper also highlights how bidding and 
bargaining interact and generate the take-over price. We find that 
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bargaining is likely to be the most important part of this process. The paper 
therefore also discusses several factors that may influence the bargaining 
position of corporate control contestants, such as the effects of time value of 
money, competition, financial strength and initial toeholds on the bargaining 
position of the contestants. 
To show how bidding and bargaining interact, we will consider a simple 
numerical example. Admittedly, our setting may seem overly simple in many 
respects. But the purpose is to lay bare the nature of the interaction 
between bidding and bargaining, and the factors that influence the 
bargaining strength of the parties seeking corporate control. We feel that 
these basic insights are also likely to be relevant in more complicated and 
more realistic situations. 
The paper is organized as follows. We frrst show how take-over prices are 
determined in a world in which bargaining is impossible. (The reader is 
warned that outcome of this analysis is decidedly odd.) We then consider 
take-over prices in a more realistic setting where both bidding and 
bargaining can occur, and show how the outcome seems to be more 
intuitively acceptable. Next we focus on how initial toeholds, competition in 
the take-over market and financial strength may influence the offer price. 
The fmal section summarises the paper. 
1. The remarkable implications of a pure bidding situation. 
To fully appreciate the interaction of bargaining and bidding as a 
determinant of a take-over price let us first consider a hypothetical world in 
which no bargaining exists and in which all take-overs are realized through 
a pure bidding process. For simplicity, we consider full buyout offers only.l 
The impossibility of bargaining of course implies that once the shares of the 
target are acquired, ownership can no longer be transferred through 
subsequent negotiations. Or put differently, the initial assumption is that 
control over a target firm is permanently allocated to the winner of the 
bidding contest. 
Let's introduce the contestants. One chief actor is the group currently in 
control, denoted by C. For concreteness we assume (as is the case for many 
l. Sercu and Van Hulle [1990] consider also partial buyouts: all insights continue to hold 
also for the latter type of offers. 
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firms) that before the take-over, the target firm is controlled by a large 
shareholder or group of shareholders, which appoints management and 
determines corporate policy. Under C's control, the target company's shares 
are worth Sc = 800. This Sc is equal to the total number of shares times the 
current value per share of the target company, and stands for the present 
value of future dividends expected under its current management. C, as a 
major stockholder, of course has a share in these dividends. In addition, C 
receives some control benefits from this target firm (e.g. through transfer 
pricing or synergies with other firms owned by C); these private benefits 
have a present value Zc = 600 . Assuming that C initially owns 30 % of the 
target's shares, this implies that C's total benefits are worth, in present 
value terms, (.3 x Sc) + Zc = (.3 x 800) + 600 = 840. 
C's antagonist is a (ultimately successful) bidding company, B. Initially this 
firm B owns a toehold of 10% in the target. As B is not part of the 
controlling group, it doesn't share in the private benefits of control. That is, 
before the take-over B receives, in present value terms, .1 x Sc = .1 x 800 = 
80 in benefits from the target. If B would take over the firm, improved 
management policies would drive up the total value of the target's shares to 
SB = 1300. In addition, B would be able to reap control benefits worth ZB = 
700. To sum up: under C's management team the target generates benefits 
for a total economic worth ofVc = Sc + Zc = 800 + 600 = 1400; under B's 
management this total economic worth would increase to VB= SB + ZB = 
1300 + 700 = 2000. Clearly B is better fit to manage the target. 
The chorus in our play is formed by the many small third shareholders that, 
together, own the remaining 60% of the shares. The role of this group is 
passive: they just tender (or don't tender) to bids offered by B or C. For 
simplicity we assume that the initial ownership positions of C and B are 
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known to C and B. and that everybody agrees on the values of Sc, V C· SB 
and VB. Obviously this perfect information assumption is unlikely to hold in 
reality; but we will see later on that the basic arguments continue to hold 
even when information is imperfect. Finally we suppose that C can defend 
its position in the target company by launching counterbids. To fmance 
such an MBO (or, at least, to lend credibility to the threat of a counterbid) 
we initially presume that C can easily and quickly raise cash; for instance, C 
has access to the junk bond market. We will discuss the consequences of 
dropping this assumption when we investigate the importance of financial 
strength in Section 3.3. 
The issue is what price B will have to pay for the target company. 
1.1. B Has to Pay Out All its Private Benefits. 
A first requirement is that the price be "realistic" in the sense that it is likely 
to convince the small shareholders. This requirement imposes a first floor to 
B's price PB: PB should exceed the post-bid stock price. To see this, assume 
that B offers 1320. By tendering, the other stockholders are better off than 
by holding out, whoever wins the contest: 1320 exceeds the value 800 of the 
shares when C wins, and also the stock price 1300 if B ends up in control. 
Nor do the small shareholders forego possible better offers later on if they 
tender immediately. Under current legislation in most Anglo-saxon and 
European countries, shareholders that immediately tender to a bidder are 
entitled to any better price subsequently offered by that bidder within the 
offer period. Likewise, if within the offer period another bidder with a better 
offer comes along after some shareholders have tendered, the latter may 
withdraw their shares and tender to the better offer. In our simple setting, 
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rational small shareholders will therefore certainly grasp this opportunity 
and tender as soon as the offer exceeds SB = 1300. 
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A second floor for a successful bid price PB is C's total valuation of the 
target, 1400, i.e. the total worth that C can obtain if it fully owns the 
company. If B would initially offer say PB = 1320, it would be in C's best 
interests to launch a counteroffer at say PC= 1350. To see this, note that 
when C succeeds in buying out everyone at the price PC= 1350, the value of 
C's hand would be the total company2 (worth 1400) minus the cost of 
buying out the 70% of the stock at (. 7 x 1350) = 945, i.e. 1400 - 945 = 455. 
This is better than C's remaining alternative, viz. to sell the 30% block at (.3 
x 1320) = 396.3 B's bid 1320 will therefore surely trigger a counterbid from 
C. It is easily checked that. if B offers PB = 1400, C will not rationally take 
private the firm with an offer of say 1401. So, once PB reaches the level PB = 
Vc = 1400, C will certainly abandon all hope to take private the target. 
Clearly, then, PB = Vc = 1400 is a watershed. One cannot conclude, 
however, that C will stop counterbidding as ofpB = 1400. Winning the 
contest is just one possible objective of a counterbid. But C may also 
counterbid with the purpose to drive up B's price beyond the level V c = 
1400. Suppose that B opens the bidding with PB = 1400 and that C reacts 
by a counteroffer of say PC= 1500. The bidding firm B can react in two 
ways: either it quits and sells out to C, 4 or it tops C's bid by, say, PB = 
2. Note that, if B lets C get away with this and lets the small shareholders tender, B should 
also tender to C. The price offered, 1350, exceeds the post-bid security value 800 when Cis 
in control. So the buy-out. if it occurs, will be complete indeed. 
3. C is better off with the counter-offer relative to selling out to B. There is no claim that the 
counteroffer makes C better off than before. To the contrary: before B arrived on the scene, 
C's hand was worth (0.3 x 800) + 600 = 840. Put differently, C would only make such a 
move to limit the damage caused by the threat of permanent loss of control. 
4. Recall that for the moment we live in a world in which bargaining is impossible: if B loses 
this bidding contest, it can no longer acquire control over the target. 
1600. Obviously, if B behaves rationally, it will choose that action that 
produces the highest value forB's 10% block. B's calculations are simple: 
-quitting, and selling out to Cat PC= 1500, yields 
0.1 X 1500 = 150. 
- coming back with PB = 1600 offers the prospect of obtaining full 
ownership; and then the net worth of B's hand amounts to B's valuation 
(2000) minus the cost of buying 90% of the shares at 1600, i.e. 
2000- (1600 X .9) = 560. 
A rational B will therefore decide to top C's offer. 
If C understands this process, C continues to top B's offers as long as B can 
be expected to trump C again, i.e. as long as topping C's offer and winning 
nets B more than turning around and selling out to C. In fact C can safely 
bluff with an offer ofpc = 1999 (i.e. marginally less than the value of the 
target firm to B). ForB, winning at the price PB = 2000 is still marginally 
better than withdrawing and selling out at PC= 1999, as is easily verified: 
-quitting, and selling out to Cat PC= 1999, yields 
0.1 X 1999 = 199.9 
- coming back with PB = 2000 offers the prospect of obtaining full 
ownership; and then the net worth of B's hand amounts to B's valuation 
(2000) minus the cost of buying 90% of the shares at 2000, i.e. 
2000- (2000 X .9) = 200. 
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It is not hard to check that PC = 1999 is the highest offer that B can trump 
and still be (marginally) better off winning than losing. The unexpected 
conclusion from all this is that, no matter how low the value of the target to C 
relative to the value to the bidder B, C can drive up the price to the latter level. 
In fact, B's only remaining gain is the capital gain on its initial toehold, 5 and 
without a toehold there is no incentive whatsoever. Conversely, B's potential 
private benefits are fully reflected (and paid for) in the take-over price. 
1.2. The Role of the Option to Re-bid. 
The fact that all this is independent of the value of the target to C (or to any 
next-best bidder, for that matter) is very much at odds with the familiar 
outcome of a sealed bid auction. Under the present information 
assumptions, the highest valuation bidder will win the sealed-bid contest, 
but only pays a price equal to the valuation of the second highest bidder. In 
other words, if control over the target would have been allocated through a 
two-player sealed bid auction, B would only have had to pay a price equal to 
vc = 1400. 
The reason why our outcome is different is that, with a sealed bid auction, 
no contender can revise his initial offer price. It is easy to demonstrate that, 
if in the above take-over process company B would not be allowed to revise 
its original offer, it would likewise not have to pay more than PB = 1400 for 
the target company. As before, B would still offer no less than 1400, as a 
lower price would give C a sure incentive to (irrevocably) take private the 
firm. However, in the absence of revisions B would not have to offer more 
5. Before the contest started B's stocks were worth .1 x 800 = 80: we just saw that at the 
end of the contest B's net benefits amount to 200; the difference is the gain on B's initial 
toehold, that is 0.1 x (VB - Sc) = 0.1 x (2000 - 800)). SoB still has an incentive to take-over 
the target. 
than 1400 either. For if C would ever launch a counteroffer above 1400, the 
incumbent management group would end up with full ownership over a 
company for which it paid more than it can afford -- so C will not do so. Put 
differently, without revisions C would not have been able to use its bidding-
up strategy, because B simply would not be allowed to overtrump C. In 
short, a mechanism where, like in reality, bidders may revise offers will lead 
to higher prices than mechanisms whereby such a revision is not possible. 
1.3. The Effects of Heterogeneous Perceptions about Values. 
Let us add uncertainty about VB and V c to the picture. We will first 
introduce asymmetric information regarding the true value of the target 
under B's management: VB is perfectly known to B, but C has only an 
imperfect idea about this. (We still assume that everybody agrees about V c·) 
Such an information asymmetry is advantageous to the bidder. Suppose 
that C does not drive up the price to the "true" VB (because C has 
underestimated VB• or because of risk aversion); B then gets hold of the 
target at a price below what it is worth to him, and gains. Suppose, 
alternatively, that if C overbids (because Cis over-optimistic) and offers a 
price PC above VB; then it is very advantageous for B to tum around and 
sell out, as we have argued before; and B gains again. In short, the less-
informed player is likely to lose (and would therefore be prepared to go 
through the cost of gathering additional information). 
If, as we assume, V c is fully known, B would still have to pay alleast V c = 
1400. In addition, C would still bid up the price to some extent above this 
lower bound, based upon C's estimate of VB. Hence the basic message 
remains intact: in a take-over situation without any bargaining opportunity 
a bidder may expect to have to pay a high price for a target; if there is little 
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uncertainty about VB he may have to pay a price equal to his valuation, 
even if this valuation is much higher than that of other bidders. 
In the case in which company B is unsure itself about the exact value ofVs. 
nothing much changes either. What is important for C in that case is to 
have a good idea about B's perception ofVs: B's decision whether or not to 
outbid C depends on that figure. If the incumbent target management has a 
good understanding of B's expectations, it knows how far it may go with its 
bidding-up strategy. 
As a final remark, note that in all these arguments V c has not played a 
major role. In our current setting, uncertainty about the exact value of V c is 
relatively unimportant; what matters is the knowledge of whether or not V c 
is lower than VB. If C's view on V c is higher than B's view on Vs. that would 
offer B the opportunity to play the same type of bidding-up strategy that C 
played in our numerical example. That is, if company C thinks it is the 
better bidder, roles are reversed and B can scare the incumbent 
management into taking the target company private at its own valuation V C· 
In corporate parlance, this is greenmail. From the market's point of view, 
this amounts to paying back to the shareholders the private benefits from 
which they were wrongfully excluded before. 
All this (artificially) assumed away the possibility of negotiations between B 
and C. We will see now that if bargaining is possible the situation of the 
bidder generally improves dramatically. 
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2. Take-over prices in a world with bidding and bargaining 
Let's go back to the moment where corporation B is just launching its initial 
offer, and let's add bargaining as an option. This new option means that the 
winner of the bidding contest needs not remain in control for ever and a day: 
or, in other words, B now understands that it is not necessary to 
immediately outbid C in order to gain control over the target. Instead B may 
find it beneficial to let C win the bidding contest and afterwards negotiate 
about purchasing the target. As B's valuation of the target is higher than 
C's, a rational C would be prepared to sell during such negotiations in 
return for a share in the gains that B can achieve. Put differently, both B 
and C stand to gain from a negotiated transfer of the target if they can agree 
upon a price in between Vc = 1400 and VB= 2000.6 
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To simplify things, let us initially assume that, at the moment company B 
launches its initial offer, both Band C anticipate what this negotiated price 
will be: for instance, this negotiated price PN could amount to PN = 1700 (B 
and C split the difference (VB - V ell 7. Obviously, in reality the estimate of 
PN would be subject to error. However, we will see later on that also here the 
basic mechanism of the process is not affected by uncertainty about the 
negotiated price PN· 
6. Notice that at the time the negotiations start. the price at which C bought out the small 
shareholders is a sunk cost and hence. from a purely economic perspective, should not 
have any impact on the bargaining talks. Bygones are bygones, and all what matters is 
what B and C can get out of the company in the future. 
7. The interpretation of PN is similar to that of PC or PB· 1. e. price per share times total 
number of shares. 
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2.1. The Solution: B Publicly Offers the Expected Negotiations Price. 
It is not hard to see that presently C's bidding-up strategy will be 
considerably less effective than before. As long as C offers a price PC that 
remains below the anticipated bargaining outcome PN = 1700, a rational B 
will react as before, by increasing its offer price above C's. However, as soon 
as C offers a PC higher than 1700, say PC = 1800, it is in B's best interest to 
withdraw from the contest and sell out to C at 1800, and afterwards buy the 
entire target for PN = 1700 during negotiations. Clearly from C's point of 
view, purchasing first 70% of the target's shares at PC= 1800 and 
afterwards selling out to B for PN = 1700 is not very appealing. Hence a 
rational C would not drive up the public bidding price above PN = 1700. On 
the other hand, C would not allow B to gain control at a bid price below PN = 
1700 either. If C lets B get way with a public bid at say PB = 1600, Bends 
up with 700/b of the shares, and C is no longer in a position to negotiate. 
That is, all C would own in the latter case would be a minority stake in the 
target worth 0.3 x SB = 0.3 x 1300 = 390, or, if C sells out too, 0.3 x 1600 = 
480. C would therefore have an incentive to top B's bid and force the 
acquiror to pay more than 1600. For example, if C bids 1699 and B comes 
back with 1700, C's block is worth .3 x 1700 = 510. To sum up, the best the 
incumbent management group of the target can do in the present situation 
is drive up the public bidding price to the anticipated bargaining price PN = 
1700. 
But once B offers PB = PN = 1700, there is no longer any point in going 
explicitly through the whole process (C winning the public bidding contest at 
PC = PN = 1700 and afterwards negotiating with B and selling out again at 
PN = 1700). So as soon as B offers a PB = PN = 1700, C may as well sell out 
during public bidding and let B win control immediately. 8 If, as in reality, 
negotiations take time and cause delays in settling the take-over problem, 
both B and C would even be strictly better off if the take-over process does 
not (explicitly) proceed into the bargaining stage. In such a case, no explicit 
negotiations would take place. and only public bidding would be observed; 
nevertheless the price B pays to achieve control would be determined by the 
(potential) negotiations process. and would equal the anticipated negotiated 
price! 
The key idea is that C bids up B's public offer price to the level the 
incumbent target management expects if there would be explicit 
negotiations with B. In this setting, take-over prices are likely to be lower 
than in the fictitious world of section 1. If B's bargaining position is strong 
and the split-the-difference outcome therefore out of the question, the 
bidder may not even have to pay much more than the incumbent target 
management's own valuation V C· And if B is better off. C (and the third 
shareholders) are worse off. But C has no choice, and is simply forced to go 
along in this bidding-and-(implicit)-bargaining process: if C overplays its 
hand and offers more than 1700 in a public bid, B sells out and then takes 
over the whole target at 1700. 
The two main conclusions of this section so far are that: 
- the observed offer price of a winning (hostile) public bid actually is a 
bargaining price although (generally) no negotiations are observed 
explicitly: 
- generally the bidder pays a price between V c and VB, a price that depends 
upon his (implicit) relative bargaining strength. 
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8. When small shareholders are offered the price PB = 1700, it is in their best interest to 
tender their shares. as the post bid value of these securities will only be equal to s8 = 1300. 
2.2. Uncertainty about the Values of the Target to the Respective 
Contenders 
Uncertainty and especially asymmetric information about VB and/ or V c is 
likely to create uncertainty about PN too. The arguments of section 1 can be 
reinvoked to show that uncertainty and/ or asymmetric information about 
PN has exactly the same effects as uncertainty and/ or asymmetric 
information about VB in the world of section 1. We conclude again that 
imperfect information is likely to be more disadvantageous for the target's 
current Board than for the bidder. 9 
2.3. Negotiations before the Bidding Contest. 
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Thus far, negotiations (if any) were assumed to take place after a hostile 
bidding contest. Van Hulle and Sercu [1990] consider also negotiations that 
precede public bidding. Taking the outcome of post-bid negotiations as a 
reference point, they find that pre-bid negotiations are entirely neutral for all 
parties concerned as long as the group currently in control is paid no more 
than the third shareholders. The snag is that pre-bid negotiations do offer 
ample opportunities for (disguised) discrimination against the small 
shareholders. One example of such a conspiracy is that, in return for C 
accepting a lower public offer price, B signs a nice transfer pricing deal with 
another company held by C; or C is allowed to remain on the target's board 
and enjoy other abnormal perks. This is obviously to the third shareholders' 
disadvantage. 
* * * 
9. This assumes that Vc < v8 ; otherwise the roles may be reversed just as in section 1). 
The main message of this section is that take-over prices are determined by 
bargaining processes even if these negotiations are not actually observed. 
We now turn to a discussion of some factors that may have an impact on the 
strength of B and C's bargaining position. 
3. Factors affecting Bargaining Strength in the Bidding-and-(Implicit)-
Ba:rgafnfng Process. 
We showed in section 2 that, unless bargaining is outlawed, take-over prices 
are essentially determined by the option to negotiate. In this (implicit) 
bargaining stage C negotiates with B after a successful public of C. Taking 
as our null hypothesis that equally strong negotiators will sooner or later 
simply split the difference, 10 we define the strength of B's (C's) bargaining 
position as the extent to which B (C) is likely to force a deviation from the 
split-the-difference rule. In particular, if the negotiated take-over price PN is 
likely to be below (above) (VB- Vc)/2 = 1700, we say that B (C) has a 
stronger bargaining position than C (B). We will now discuss some factors 
that may influence Band C's the strength ofB and C's position in this 
bargaining situation. 
3.1. The Concepts of Time Value and "Time Pressure" 
In the (generally implicit) bargaining situation of section 2, C acquires 
control of the target during a public bidding contest, and negotiates with B 
about the distribution of the difference in B's and C's valuation, (VB - V c). 
One of the tactics that B and/ or C may use is to stall the negotiations, or 
threaten to do so. Hence the negotiating parties may face the prospect of 
10 See Binmore et alii (1986). 
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time passing by, thereby postponing the realization of the increase in value. 
Such delays not only causes loss of time value of money: they may even 
endanger the very realization of the improvement. Indeed, the prospective 
acquiror company may be in a position where it needs to act quickly to tum 
its projected benefits into actual profits. 
In most fmancial situations, the time value element itself exerts identical 
pressures on both B and C: the time value of money is determined by the 
fmancial markets and is in principle not company- or investor-specific. 
Imagine, for instance, two equally well informed investors who negotiate the 
sale of government bonds. If the deal is clinched immediately, payment and 
delivery is immediate; and delays would merely mean that the buyer pays 
for accrued interest to compensate the seller for the time value lost. That is, 
in present value terms nothing would be gained or lost by delaying the 
transaction. Hence if pure time value would be the only factor to be taken 
into account, an equal split of the benefits would still be the normal 
outcome of the talks. 
There is a second element, though, to wit the possibility that the gain (VB -
V cl may partly or wholly disappear; and this may or may not affect the 
relative bargaining strengths. For instance, if this gain is a now-or-never 
and unique opportunity that can only be realized if this specific bidder 
immediately controls this specific target company, the potential loss of (VB-
V c) equally affects B and C: failed negotiations imply that this opportunity 
is gone forever for both of them. But if this gain does not represent a unique 
and now-or-never opportunity to B or C, the pressure exerted by the clock's 
ticking and the cake's melting away will be less important for the party with 
other opportunities. And this should obviously increase that party's relative 
patience and therefore also its share of the gains. In the next subsection we 
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discuss how asymmetric time-pressure may lead to a deviation from the 
split-the-difference solution. 
3.2 Competition in the take-over market 
Let us consider frrst a situation in which C is the only target frrm B can 
profitably tum around, while C is in the comfortable position of being 
coveted by many bidders. In short, we consider a single target and several 
bidders. Let us denote the "best" bidder by B; any other bidder B' has a 
valuation VB'< VB. For ease of argument, we again assume perfect 
agreement: all valuations are known to the control contestants, and if one of 
the other bidders ever gains control during public bidding and afterwards 
negotiates with B, the outcome of these negotiations is likewise known from 
the start of the contest. 11 Since company B is the "best". we would expect it 
to ultimately take over the target firm; indeed, as long as B has not gained 
control we would expect the contest to continue, since negotiations would 
still offer opportunities of mutually beneficial trade. Nevertheless the 
existence of other bidders implies a lower bound on the price B will have to 
pay during public bidding; that is, generally it will no longer be sufficient if 
B just offers the negotiated price PN of Section 2 (e.g. PN = 1700, in our 
example). The reason is that PB must offer no incentive to any other bidder 
B' to contest the outcome; otherwise some B' would be better off 
counterbidding with a slightly better price (say 1710), take over the target, 
negotiate with B and sell out for an even higher negotiated price PB B' to B 
• 
(say PB,B' = 1900). That is, any competing bidder can adopt the strategy 
that C followed in Section 2. The critical contender clearly is the potential 
ll. Adding uncertainty about VB· SB· V C• Sc. PN· asymmetric information and 
heterogeneous valuations, transactions costs. taxes. etc. would complicate, but not 
eliminate, the basic arguments. Since we are mainly interested in an analysis of the impact 
of the size of initial toeholds on the (implicit) bargaining strength of B and C, we do not 
pursue these issues further. 
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bidder B' that has the strongest bargaining position vis-a-vis B. Denoting 
the anticipated bargaining solution between B and B' by PB B', the 
' 
arguments of section 2 then show that this critical B' will bid up the public 
offer price to PB,B' (for instance 1900, in our previous example). In short, 
after bringing in bargaining into a contest with many candidates, we are 
back at the sealed-bid solution that appeared to be discredited by the 
revisable-bid feature of a pure bidding argument. In the presence of many 
bidders C will be bought out at a higher price than 1700 because the 
existence of competing bidders strengthens its bargaining position. Or, on 
other words, C has a monopoly position and can extract a higher price. 
If we reverse the situation, the outcome is reversed too. Let us consider a 
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situation with a single bidder and several alternative targets with respective 
incumbent management groups C' (i.e. one bidder and several targets), and 
assume that the bidder is interested in taking over just one target. Before 
starting any public bidding, B will evaluate the gains it could realize in any 
of the targets. That is, for every target the acquiring firm estimates first what 
price it would have to pay if it would be in the take-over situation of section 
2. Then one possible decision for B is to go for the target where it expects to 
make the largest total gains, i.e. its negotiated share in the cake (VB - V C') 
plus the capital gain on its initial toehold. Another possible decision is to 
attack any other target and threaten to walk away from the negotiations 
unless the incumbent management accepts a price that yields the bidder at 
least the same total gains as the first strategy. For example, assume that B 
can gain 500 units by taking over C'; then our original target C is no longer 
in a position to insist on a take-over value of 1700, as this would net B only 
a 300 share in the gain VB - V c = 600 plus a capital gain of 90 on the 
toehold. In short, C's position is now weakened, because B here is the 
monopolist facing many small players. 
3.3. Financial strength 
Thus far we have discovered four possible lower bounds on a successful bid 
price PB: 
1) PB must be tempting to the small shareholders; 
2) it must leave C better off as compared to the option to take private the 
target; 
3) it must leave C no room to bid up the price (to VB in section 1, or to PN < 
VB as soon as we realize the importance of potential negotiations); and 
4) it must likewise leave no room to any third party to bid up the price (to 
PB,B'). 
Bounds (2) and (3) crucially depend on C's ability to finance the purchase of 
the shares until the negotiated take-over. Bound (4) likewise depends on the 
ability of B' to temporarily take over the target. And the negotiated price PN 
or PB,B' of course assumes that B is able to provide the cash. 
One crucial issue, then, is each party's financial strength, defined as its 
ability to obtain, for whatever period is necessary, the cash needed to 
implement the strategies outlined before. Without cash or credit lines, C 
would generally not be capable to counterbid or at least credibly threaten to 
do so. In the absence of rival bidders B', the effect of such a lack of financial 
strength would be dramatic. Instead of having to pay a (generally implicitly) 
negotiated price between V c and VB, it would be sufficient for the bidder to 
offer a price that just suffices to bring the small shareholders to tender. 
Going back to the numbers in Section 2, for example, B would be able to 
purchase the target at a price just above lower bound (1), SB = 1300, rather 
than at PN = 1700. Quick cash at hand also fosters competition among 
bidders and hence helps to raise the take-over price even more. And, clearly, 
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financial strength is also relevant to corporation B, which might not have 
sufficient funds of its own to pay for the target's shares. 
It does not matter how the players obtain their cash. Their source may be 
holdings of marketable securities and the like, or proceeds of spin-offs. In 
the eighties quick fmancing usually meant issuing debt, though. The 
emergence of quick fmancing mechanisms like junk bonds, bridge loans, 
and "merchant banking" (in the US sense of the word) clearly have improved 
the financial strengths of both defendant and bidder(s). and should have 
contributed to higher take-over prices. 
But raising cash is not the only issue; C must also be able to meet the 
interest bills as long as the ultimate take-over isn't finalized. B has less of a 
problem here, as B's financing needs (if any) start only after the 
negotiations. This could strengthen B's bargaining situation. Suppose that 
C's marketable wealth, including possible stakes in other companies, is 
limited, so that C had to borrow to finance its temporary MBO. B could then 
maneuver C into a very difficult situation by stalling negotiations: servicing 
the debt could become a serious problem. Obviously C has the advantage of 
control over the target firm during negotiations, and can use its share in the 
target's dividends and its private benefits to service the debt. But if these 
cash flows do not cover the debt servicing outlays, protracted negotiations 
may mean fmancial distress for C. Clearly in this latter case time presses 
relatively harder on C and hence weakens C's bargaining strength. To what 
extent C's bargaining strength is reduced depends on many factors, such as 
the (un)willingness of the creditors to roll over the debt and the bankruptcy 
laws. 
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To sum up: once a take-over has started the capital market's capacity to 
quickly provide large amounts of cash strongly favours the incumbent 
management's position to drive up the take-over price and B's ability to 
fmance the ultimate take-over at a high price. But C is best off if its defense 
can be mounted with limited borrowing: liquidity problems during the 
negotiations stage would severely erode C's bargaining position. 
3.4. Initial toeholds 
In the literature there is no consensus about how the size of initial toeholds 
affects the take-over price. Some argue that, the more shares one needs to 
buy of a particular target, the higher the premium one has to offer to bring a 
sufficient number of small shareholders to part from their shares. In this 
view, large bidder toeholds would be associated with smaller purchased 
amounts, and thus with smaller premiums.12 Others argue the opposite 
way. Because a large bidder's toehold implies an important financial 
commitment, the bidder strongly wishes to obtain control in order to realize 
the take-over gains and the concomitant profit on the engaged funds; this 
strong wish to win would be reflected in a higher price.13 
The size of the toehold may also affect the outcome via the bidder's capital 
gain on its initial toehold. To fully grasp the argument, let us again compute 
B's gain if the target is taken over at PN = 1700 and B's stake was 10%. At 
the end of the game, B holds a company now worth 2000, but to achieve 
this B had to fork out 1700 x .9 to buy up the 90% of the stock held by 
others. B's gain, as compared to the initial value of its block (10% of Sc = 
800). works out as 
12. See Stultz [1988]. 
13. See Dewatrtpont [1990]. 
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(2000 - (.9 X 1 700)] - (.1 X 800) = 390 
or 
(2000 - 1 700) + .1 X (1700 - 800) = 390 
More in general, then, B's gain has two components. First there is B's share 
in the cake, viz. the difference of the target's value to B and the price of the 
company valued at the take-over price PB -- here (2000 - 1 700) = 300. 
Second there is B's capital gain of (1700- 800) on 10% of the shares, to wit 
90.14 So, in general, B's gain is 
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where tB is B's initial toehold. One interpretation then is that, for a given v8 
and s0 there is a negative trade-off between toehold and tender price. To 
achieve the same overall gain of 390 with a toehold tB of 5%, B would only 
be willing to offer PB = 1652.6. (Of course, 390 is a relatively large gain. But 
similar conclusions hold if B wants to obtain a lower minimal gain.) A subtly 
different argument is that small toeholds require large value gains (VB - Sc) 
if they are to generate the same gains: and large value gains (VB - Sc) tend 
to go with higher take-over premiums (PB- Sc): so ultimately small toeholds 
again are associated with large take-over prices.15 
It is clear from our previous arguments that the incumbent management of 
the target can be considered as one of the bidders too. However, incumbent 
management's outlook is somewhat different from that of the other bidders: 
C initially is in control and receives private benefits; also, if C wishes to 
14. From another angle, the 90 stands for the savings created by the fact that B did not 
have to pay the premium (1700- 800) on the 10% already held before the contest started. 
15. See Shleifer and Vishny [1986]. This variant is partly a selection mechanism. since we 
allow VB to vary. In the first argument, VB is given. 
obtain control, its purpose may not be to change management policies. 
Apart from this proviso, it is not hard to modify the above arguments to fit 
the incumbent management's position; some factors would predict that the 
take-over price is likely to increase as a function of C's initial toehold while 
other arguments that suggest the reverse. 
Our bargaining model sheds a new light on this whole debate. If we carefully 
think about the meaning of the initial toehold within the negotiations 
framework Section 2, we see that the toehold's direct impact on bargaining 
strength is likely to be limited. For C, a large initial toehold means that if all 
stages in the take-over process of section 2 would be played explicitly, 
incumbent management would only need to buy up a relatively smaller 
fraction of the total number of outstanding shares to achieve control. Hence 
C would need to mobilize less additional financial resources. Put differently, 
a large initial toehold of incumbent management in its firm is likely to be 
associated with large financial strength on their part. So one link between 
initial toehold and bargaining strength may be indirect, via financial 
strength. For the bidder, this indirect link between initial toehold and 
bargaining strength is likely to be far less important than for C: if the 
negotiations stage is played explicitly, C has won the public bidding and 
hence is burdened with financing the tendered shares until an agreement is 
reached, whereas B does not have any financing needs until that moment. 
Van Hulle and Sercu [1990] also suggest a direct link between C's 
bargaining strength and C's initial toehold. The factor is the relative 
performance of the target during the period C is mounting white knight 
defenses or is negotiating a take-over with B. In fact many practitioners 
share the belief that, as much of managerial time and effort is consumed by 
the take-over process, the profitability of the target may dip under its 
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normal level as long as the control contest lasts. If this is true, it is clear 
that such a below-normal performance weakens C's bargaining position. As 
C has much resources tied up in the firm (remember that during the 
negotiations stage C owns the majority of the shares), a below-normal rate of 
return on these invested funds may exert strong pressure on C to seek a 
quick settlement. Hence if the take-over process itself consumes 
management resources, ownership position during the negotiations stage 
and bargaining strength would be negatively related. The same factor may 
also put pressure on B; and the larger B's stake during the negotiations 
stage, the stronger the pressure will be. But as B's stake, at the moment of 
negotiations, is far lower than C's, the direct link would essentially work 
against C rather than against B. 
4. Conclusions 
This paper argues that in a world in which bidders may use both bidding 
and bargaining to achieve control over a target, public take-over prices (also 
in hostile deals) are likely to be determined by bargaining. This bargaining 
stage however is usually played implicitly rather than actually observed. 
Consequently the (implicit) bargaining strength would be very important in 
determining the public take-over price the winning bidder has to pay. 
Several factors that may influence this bargaining strength have been 
considered. Some factors are likely to have a profound impact, such as 
uncertainty about how much value the bidders can obtain from the target, 
competition in the take-over market, and financial strength of the 
contenders. The influence of the size of initial toeholds on bargaining 
strength may be more of an indirect nature. 
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